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TECK COMINCO AND THE WISDOM OF DEFERRING
TO THE COURT FIRST SEISED, ALL THINGS BEING
EQUAL
Janet Walker*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the joys of life as a common lawyer comes with engaging in
the dynamic interplay between the facts of individual cases and the
legal rules that apply to them. With each new case the rules are tested
against the instinctive sense of thejustice or injustice that comes from
applying them to the facts. In cases of sufficient importance to be
granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court ofCanada, the interplay
can be particularly exciting. A good case can make very good law, and
a decision of the Supreme Court can be given very broad application.
It is fortunate, then, that the Supreme Court granted leave in Lloyd's
Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd. (Teck Cominco)1 because its facts are
particularly illuminating in respect of two key premises on which the
support for the first-seised rule is based.
This article is about the wisdom of deferring to the court first
seised, all things being equal, because the Teck Cominco appeal will
determine whether, all things being equal, the proceeding commenced
later in time should be stayed when the two proceedings are
commenced in different countries, one after another, in the same
case. The wonderful thing about the Teck Cominco case is that its facts
make us look more closely at the two underlying premises: that the
proceedings have been commenced one after another, and that they
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Although I have considered the questions
of parallel proceedings in the past as a text writer in Casteland Walker: Canadian
Conflict of Laws, looseleaf ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2005), §13.6, as a

commentator in "Parallel Proceedings -

Converging Views" (2000), 38 Can.

Y.B. Int'l Law 155, and even as an assistant to counsel to one of the respondents

1.

in this matter, this article tries to take a closer look at issues not canvassed in any
detail in those other contexts.
Lloyd's Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd. (2007), 279 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2007] 7
W.W.R. 281, 398 W.A.C. 218 sub nor. Lombard GeneralInsurance Co. of Canada
v. Cominco Ltd. (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted 284 D.L.R. (4th)

vii.
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have been brought in the same case. It gives us a special insight into the
way the first-seised rule operates in practice and whether it is in fact
suitable for use by common law courts in Canada when parallel
proceedings are ongoing in another country. Although it may seem
difficult to dispute the logic of the first-seised rule in principle, the
Teck Cominco case shows how all things may not actually be equal in
situations of parallel proceedings and, as a result, the first-seised rule
may be useful in far fewer situations than we might once have
thought.
II. DEFERRING TO THE COURT "FIRST SEISED"
Turning to the first of these two premises, the facts of Teck
Cominco are particularly thought provoking because the two
proceedings were commenced on the same day and because this
was no accident. The parties had entered into a standstill agreement
by which, until a specified date, they undertook not to commence
proceedings so as to be free to resolve their differences without
litigation. As the deadline for negotiations approached, they readied
themselves for action. When the agreement expired, both parties
immediately commenced proceedings - Teck Cominco in the State
3
of Washington, 2 and Lloyd's in the province of British Columbia.
Since it was not happenstance that the matters were commenced on
the same day, the first-seised rule could not bejustified as a potentially
arbitrary but neutral means of distinguishing between the parties'
entitlement to select the forum. 4 On the contrary, the Teck Cominco
scenario shows how parallel proceedings are likely to become
increasingly commonplace in cases involving serious jurisdictional
contests and how it is unlikely that the two proceedings will just
happen to be commenced close in time to one another. The standstill
2.
3.

Pakootasv. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., 452 F. 3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pakootas).
Underwriters, Lloyd's v. Cominco Ltd., [2006] B.C.J. No. 1917 (QL), [2006] 12
W.W.R. 486, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 261, sub nom. Lloyd's Underwriters v. Cominco
Ltd. (S.C.), affd 79 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2007] 7 W.W.R. 281, 398 W.A.C. 218 sub
nom. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada v. Cominco Ltd. Other insurers

who have been parties to this proceeding are Lombard General Insurance
Company of Canada, The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company as
successor to The Canadian Indemnity Company, ING Insurance Company of
Canada f/k/a The Halifax Insurance Company, American Home Assurance
Company as successor to New Hampshire Insurance Company, and Seaton
Insurance Company. The insured parties, who are compendiously described in
this paper as "Teck Cominco," include Cominco Ltd., Teck Cominco Limited
4.

and Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. and "TCML."
Such as might be the case for, say, the application of the lex loci delicti as the law

governing a tort.
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agreement and the inevitable race to the courthouse that follows its
expiry are themselves a product of the concern that the first-seised
rule will be used to determine which party's choice of forum will
prevail.
If chance does not provide a good rationale for the use of the firstseised rule, could the parties' relative diligence provide a better one?
Perhaps so - at least where the first proceeding is well underway
before the second is commenced. The commencement of a proceeding
in another forum long after the first proceeding was brought could
indicate that the plaintiff in the second proceeding does not earnestly
desire to resolve the dispute and has not chosen the alternative forum
because it is genuinely more appropriate, but rather has commenced
the second proceeding in order to frustrate the first.5 Perhaps a party
who does not take the opportunity to object to jurisdiction in the first
court and yet, when the proceedings are well advanced, takes steps to
commence a parallel proceeding elsewhere, should be presumed to
have waived the right to object to the other party's choice of forum. In
addition to the inferences that may be drawn about the bonafides of
the parties' choices of forum, a considerable lapse of time may raise
concerns about administrative efficiency. To the extent that it is
appropriate for courts to concern themselves with judicial economy
in other fora, a court may be reluctant to exercise jurisdiction in a
situation where it will be bound to give rise to duplicative litigation
and, therefore, waste. In the United States, the relevance of a parallel
proceeding commenced
in another court is assessed in terms of the
6
.
progress
its
of
extent
However, in the Teck Cominco case, as seems likely to be the case in
other situations where the matters are commenced close in time to one
another, there was nothing to indicate that either party lacked
diligence. In Teck Cominco, both parties commenced proceedings at
the earliest possible moment in their respective fora. Indeed, from this
perspective, it might be said that the proceedings were commenced at
the same time.
Still, a bystander with a stopwatch would note that the proceedings
were not commenced simultaneously. In fact, they were commenced
several hours apart. One can imagine various scenarios in which this
might occur. For example, the courts may open at 9h00 in London
when it is only 4:00 a.m. in New York because they are in different
5.

See Henry v. Henry (1996), 185 C.L.R. 571 at para. 18, [1995] HCA 64 (Aust.

6.

H.C.).
N. Jansen Calamita, "Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of
International Parallel Proceedings" (2006), 27 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 601.
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time zones. Even though New York and Toronto are in the same time
zone, the court houses were open in New York City on Tuesday, July
1, 2008, but not in Toronto, and vice versa on Friday, July 4, 2008.
Even in places in the same time zone on days when both courts are
open, the opening hours may differ. For example, the courts in
Washington State might open at 8:30 a.m., and the courts in British
Columbia might not be open until 9:00 a.m.7 In short, if diligence was
thejustification for using the first-seised rule, it would be necessary to
find a way of addressing the potential for systemic unfairness arising
in situations in which the earliest possible moment for commencing
the proceedings differs from one forum to another.
The potential for systemic unfairness arose in the European Union
where the first-seised rule is used. Article 27 of the Brussels I
Regulation provides that, "where proceedings involving the same
cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts
of different member states, any court other than the court first seised
shall of its own motion stay the proceedings until such time as the
jurisdiction of the court first seised is established." 8 The systemic
unfairness arose in Europe from the provision in the Brussels
Convention that made the definition of the moment at which a
proceeding was commenced a matter of the national law of the
member states. In some member states, a proceeding is regarded as
commenced when the notice is served upon the defendant, but in
other member states the proceeding is regarded as commenced when
the notice is issued by the court. As a result, the finish line in the race to
the courthouse would always be closer in some countries than in
others. Eventually, the resulting systemic unfairness was addressed
by an amendment to the Brussels regime that harmonized the
standards for determining when a proceeding had been commenced.9
A concern for systemic unfairness also arises in situations like that
in the Teck Cominco case, but not from different definitions of the
moment of seisin in Canada and the United States. The facts of the
Teck Cominco case are more interesting than that: the reason that
there was a chronological difference in the commencement of the
proceedings is that the Washington proceeding was commenced by
giving the papers to a judge at his home shortly after the clock struck
midnight.
7.
8.
9.

Indeed, as jurisdictions transition to e-filing, differences in operating hours are
becoming commonplace.
Council Regulation (Ec) No. 44/2001 of December 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and
the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 27(1).
See Article 30, ibid. See Lawrence Collins, ed., Dicey, Morris and Collins on the
Conflict of Laws, 14th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), pp. 495-98.
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It is unlikely that the practical implications of encouraging this sort
of ingenuity will be missed byjudges reading about it. Still, quite apart
from the concerns about providing an incentive for counsel to lurk on
a judge's porch late at night, the practice of resolving jurisdictional
disputes with a stopwatch raises other logistical concerns for
administering the first-seised rule. Even where the earliest possible
moment on which proceedings could be commenced in two fora is the
same, it would become necessary to establish protocols for recording
the time as well as the date on which proceedings are commenced and
for resolving disputes over the accuracy of such records. This could
add significantly to the challenges of administering the process of
commencing proceedings generally and of administering the firstseised rule in particular in cases where the race ends in a photo-finish.
One alternative might be to treat the commencement of
proceedings on the same day as simultaneous and, instead, to apply
some special tie-breaker rule. Surely, one might think, a sophisticated
means of doing so would have been devised in Europe where the firstseised rule has been in operation for many years. Sadly, the situation
seems to be far more pedestrian than one might expect. In what
appears to be the only pronouncement on the question of cases
commenced on the same day, the Oberlandesgericht (appellate court)
of Koblenz simply read and applied the relevant article of the Brussels
Convention. 10 No clever solution emerged. Article 27 of the
Convention required the court to stay its proceedings where
another court was first seised. Since no other court had been seised
on a day before it was seised, the court in Koblenz decided that it had
no obligation to stay its proceeding. The lispendens provisions of the
Convention contain no tie-breaker rule and, as a result, the parallel
proceedings continued. With the failure of the mechanism in the
Convention that was intended to replace a race to judgment with a
race to the courthouse, the multiplicity remained to be resolved by a
race to judgment.
Still, all may not be lost. There is another potentially useful
precedent for approaching this problem to be found closer to homein the law of divorce jurisdiction in Canada. Divorce in Canada is
subject to federal legislation, I' but the legislation is applied in
proceedings brought in the superior courts of the provinces. These
proceedings produce decrees concerning the status of persons that,
under the Divorce Act, have effect throughout Canada. 12 The
10.
11.
12.

S.A. C.N. V. (A Belgian Firm) v. S. GmbH (Case 2 U 1072/89), [1991] L.L.Pr. 588.
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.).
Ibid., s. 13.
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Divorce Act addresses this concern about the potential for
inconsistent results through provisions for lis pendens, but it does
not attempt to distinguish between proceedings commenced on the
same day. Instead, it provides that parallel proceedings commenced
on the same day are transferred to the Federal Court to be
consolidated into a single proceeding. The Federal Court can
accept jurisdiction over divorce cases because divorce is a matter of
federal law, 14 but this solution would not work in other areas of
private law that are not within its jurisdiction.
Perhaps, in the end, the greatest benefit of considering whether the
first-seised rule is the best response to parallel proceedings
commenced on the same day is that it highlights the practical
challenges of administering the first-seised rule in a principled way.
This prompts us to reflect on what is to be said for the merits of the rule
more generally.
Granting stays in favour of other courts already seised may be the
only certain way of eliminating every instance of multiplicity - that
is, without interfering with proceedings in other fora by granting
injunctions, as is appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances.
In Europe, where the courts have a fixed obligation to enforce one
another's judgments and cannot use stays or injunctions to eliminate
multiplicity, the first seised rule is necessary. Still, as Lord Goff
pointed out, it comes at a price. "The price is rigidity, and rigidity can
be productive of injustice. ' '16 Is eliminating every instance of
multiplicity worth the price for Canadian courts?
III. IN "THE SAME CASE"
To the introductory remarks about the joys of life as a common
lawyer, a word or two should be added about the joys of life as an
academic lawyer that come with the variety of roles played in
advancing the understanding of the law. Text writers take disparate
pronouncements in particular cases and weave them together in a
sound and coherent way to fashion the fabric of the common law and
to develop a narrative of the law on which others will rely sometimes uncritically. But with the need to generalize, they may
13. Ibid., ss. 3(2), 3(3), 4(2), 4(3), 5(2) and 5(3).
14. The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is based on a statute promulgated under s.
101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No. 5, which authorizes the federal government to create courts

"for the better administration of the laws of Canada."
15.
16.

Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96, [1993] 3 W.W.R. 441.
Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1998] 2 W.L.R. 686 (H.L.).
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wonder whether the narrative adequately reflects the complexities
arising on the facts of real cases. In contrast, commentators provoke
discussion of current issues, poking holes in the text writers' carefully
woven fabric so as to shed light on unexplored questions. They enjoy
imagining alternative scenarios, speculating on the outcome of
particular approaches and making recommendations. But in a
rapidly developing area of the law, real cases can soon emerge against
which these musings are tested. The thrill of discovering in one case
that speculative observations have been useful to judges in assessing
matters of first impression can be matched by the shoulder-shrugging
acceptance in another case that if they had anticipated its particular
facts, they might have taken a very different approach to the issues.
Turning to the second of the two premises put in issue by the Teck
Cominco case - that the two cases are "the same"-the question
arises as to whether the two proceedings are, in fact, parallel.At the
time of the scuttled Supreme Court of Canada appeal in the Westec
case, 17 the law ofjurisdiction and judgments in Canada seemed to be
evolving towards a state in which the standards for direct and indirect
jurisdiction might be truly correlative. 18 That is, the bases on which
courts would take jurisdiction would be the same as those that they
would accept as capable of supporting the recognition and
enforcement of a judgment by another court. Coupled with forum
neutral choice of law rules,' 9 there would be a reasonable expectation
of decisional harmony, i.e., that the same result would be expected to
be reached in either forum. Such conditions would obviate any
justification for parallel proceedings. Some might even say that we
have now reached that stage within Canada as between the provinces.
But that is not the question that is before the Supreme Court in Teck
Cominco, because the parallel proceeding in the Teck Cominco case is
in another country.
Still, at the time of the appeal in the Westec case, the law on the
international front appeared to be moving as rapidly as it was on the
interprovincial front. Those were the days when delegations from the
member states of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law were still actively negotiating a comprehensive multilateral
judgments convention. 20 The increasing drive to reduce the barriers
17.

Westec Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 211

(S.C.C.). At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the matter in the foreign forum
had been determined and, therefore, the issue of parallel proceedings was moot.
18.

As envisaged by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd. v.

De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 217.
19.

As discussed in Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289,

[1995] 1 W.W.R. 609.
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to the recognition of foreign judgments appeared to warrant
proactive steps on the part of courts. We were on the way to
achieving a situation in which, all things being equal, a stay should be
granted, and where this was not appropriate, the court would
consider granting an injunction. In other words, in situations of
parallel proceedings, comity called for21 action - of one sort or
another- to eliminate the multiplicity.
All of that seems much further off today. The Hague Conference
project to produce a comprehensive multilateral judgments
convention was reduced dramatically in scope so that the resulting
convention applies only to business-to-business disputes where the
parties have agreed on the forum. 22 No new initiatives for bilateral
arrangements with the United States- the country in which parallel
proceedings are most likely to be commenced - have been
undertaken. In the absence of a formal regime such as exists in
Europe, the only justification for eliminating multiplicity would seem
to be that the proceedings are, in fact, duplicative and, accordingly,
wasteful.
Once again, it is fortunate that the Supreme Court will consider the
issues raised by parallel proceedings on the basis of the facts of the
Teck Cominco case, because these facts highlight the error in
assuming that all cases between the same parties that are similarly
framed are duplicative. 23 It is true that parties sometimes commence
duplicative proceedings to take advantage of the logistical
conveniences that they might enjoy in a forum other than that
selected by the opposing party. It is also true that parties sometimes
commence duplicative proceedings to take advantage of the logistical
20. See Preliminary Doc. No 11 of August 2000 -

Report on the Preliminary Draft

Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, online: Hague Conference

on Private International Law, < www.hcch.net >. Although it was unclear at the
time that the conditions necessary for decisional harmony would, in fact, emerge
on the international plane: J. Walker, "Parallel Proceedings - Converging
Views" (2000), 38 Can. Y.B. Int'l Law 155 at p. 187.
21. One of the flaws in this approach that becomes evident on closer reflection is that
the reverse may also seem to be suggested: that if resolving a multiplicity of
proceedings is imperative, then a court that is not persuaded that it is sufficiently
inappropriate for a matter to go forward in another jurisdiction to warrant
issuing an injunction, by implication, should grant a stay of the local proceeding.
22. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (concluded June 30, 2005), available
online: <www.hcch.net>.
23. This analysis does not address the distinctions between the proceedings in this or
other cases of parallel proceedings that arise from an incomplete congruity
between the parties or the particular instances of the claims. This issue could be
important on the facts of other cases but it was not highlighted as among the
most significant distinctions between the proceedings in this case.
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inconveniences that the opposing party might suffer in a particular
forum. But the existing jurisprudence already equips the courts to
consider whether a stay or an injunction is needed to address the
parties' relative capacities to present their claims or defences in the
alternative fora. It is fortunate, therefore, that the parties in the Teck
Cominco case all seem readily capable of presenting their claims and
defences in both fora, and so these issues are not complicating
features of this appeal.
The beauty of the Teck Cominco appeal is that it raises the far more
challenging question of whether in view of the broader legal context in
which the issues arise, the two cases are, in fact, the same. In Teck
Cominco, the dispute that the insurers propose to try in British
Columbia concerning their liability to indemnify Teck Cominco
under the contracts of insurance is notionally the same as the dispute
that Teck Cominco proposes to try in Washington. However, that is
where the similarities between the two cases end. This may be seen
from a brief review of the history of the litigation on both sides of the
border.
Teck Cominco is a mining company based in British Columbia,
which, over the years, pursuant to government permits, discharged
slag into the Columbia River from its smelter at Trail in British
Columbia. Yes, for those readers who have taken a basic course in
public international law this is the Trail Smelter, the one whose
discharges into the atmosphere gave rise to the famous international
24
arbitration over state responsibility for transboundary pollution.
Those who are familiar with the Trail Smelter arbitration may
wonder how a complaint regarding transboundary pollution caused
by a company operating under a government licence in Canada could
come to be determined in a U.S. court as a claim by the State of
25
Washington against the company for breach of a U.S. regulation.
After all, it was once a dispute between the two governments over the
state responsibility for transboundary pollution incurred by granting
the permits authorizing the discharges. They may wonder whether it
is permissible so many years after the fact to revise the basic
understanding of the mutual rights and obligations of the various
parties involved. Could intergovernmental responsibilities ordinarily
addressed between governments or in international fora come to be
the subject of a claim by a government in its own courts against a
24.
25.

Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada) (1938), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arbitral
Trib.); Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada) (1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (Trail Smelter
Arb.), reprinted in (1941), 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C.S. §§ 9601-9675.
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private corporation operating in another country? This seems to
depend upon whether the question is asked north or south of the
border.
The answer from the perspective of U.S. law in this case has
consistently been resolved in the affirmative. This has been so from
the time that Teck Cominco first failed to persuade the Washington
courts that this application of U.S. environmental regulation was
impermissibly extraterritorial.2 6 And it continued
as far as the denial
27
of certiorariby the U.S. Supreme Court.
The answer from the perspective of Canadian law would appear to
have been resolved in the negative by the Supreme Court of Canada
some 30 years ago. In Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. v.
Manitoba28 the court held that one province did not have the
authority to pass legislation granting a right to seek relief for
environmental damage caused by discharges into the rivers in other
provinces under licences granted by those provinces because such
legislation would be impermissibly extraterritorial. Indeed, this view
was reasserted in the U.S. proceedings in this case by British
Columbia in its amicus curiae brief in support of Teck Cominco's
application for certiorari,when it submitted that, "whatever CERCLA'S
statutory structure, environmental regulation of discharge and
cleanup of pollutants that cross the U.S.-Canada border in either
26.

As the judge at first instance noted ".

.

. plaintiffs are not attempting to tell

Canada how to regulate defendant's disposal of hazardous substances into the
Columbia River, simply that they expect defendant to assist in cleaning up a mess
in the United States which has allegedly been caused by those substances.
Plaintiffs' use of CERCLA is not intended to supersede Canadian environmental
regulation of the defendant. Canada's environmental laws are intended to protect
Canadian territory, including the 10 miles from Trail, B.C. to the U.S. border.
Those laws do nothing to remedy the damage that has already occurred in U.S.
territory as a result of defendant's disposal of hazardous substances into the
Columbia River": Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 2004 WL 2578982
(E.D. Wash.), 59 ERC 1870, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,083.
27. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Seaton Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26834;
application for reconsideration dismissed 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26834.
28. Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. v. Manitoba, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, 53 D.L.R.
(3d) 321, [1975] 5 W.W.R. 382. In 1996, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a
ruling enforcing a judgment in respect of the application of the same
environmental legislation that is put in issue in the main claim in Washington.
This case involved a situation in which a Canadian defendant had engaged in
environmentally harmful activities in the United States, but the question in that
case was whether the legislation was a foreign public law, which would preclude a
judgment based on it from ever being enforced (i.e., even if the legislation had not
been applied extraterritorially): United States of America v. Ivey (1995), 26 O.R.
(3d) 533, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 674, 27 B.L.R. (2d) 221 (Gen. Div.), affd 30 O.R. (3d)
370, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 570, 93 O.A.C. 152 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused 145 D.L.R. (4th) vii.
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direction should be addressed, wherever possible, through bilateral
negotiation and agreements between the two countries, not private
lawsuits in one country's courts." 2 9 In fact, to the extent that the
Washington proceeding was understood as a claim that was initiated
to give effect to a foreign public law, the resulting judgment
might be
3
regarded as unenforceable in Canada on that basis. 0
In one sense, all of this is nothing more than background. It is not
directly relevant to the question at hand because the case brought
against Teck Cominco in Washington State is not the parallel
proceeding in question. The parallel proceeding in question is the
ancillary claim brought by Teck Cominco in Washington to recover
on its policies with its insurers. In another sense, though, this
background is crucial to understanding the context in which the
ancillary claim would be decided if the matter went ahead in
Washington.
In challenging the suitability of the Washington forum, the
insurers noted several differences in the law that would be applied by
the Washington court from the law that would be applied in British
Columbia. For example, under Washington law, any liability that
they might be found to have would not be limited to their share of the
risk, but would include joint liability up to the policy limits. In
addition, "sudden and accidental" events in insurance policies are
assessed differently under Washington law, "response costs" are
treated as damages, and a "continuous trigger" approach is taken to
property damage. 3 1 Important as these specific differences in the
applicable law may be to the parties, they pale in significance from a
commentator's perspective against the differences in the broader
context in which the legal issues would be addressed in the respective
fora.
In the Washington proceeding, the court declared that the State of
Washington had an interest in the action against Teck Cominco
29.

30.

31.

Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Joseph A. Pakootas,Donald R. Michel, and State of
Washington, No. 06-1188, May 2, 2007, Petition for a Writ of Certiorarito the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia). A similar
view was expressed by the Canadian government in its Amicus Curiae Brief, and
in Austen L. Parrish, "Trail Smelter D~ji Vu: Extraterritoriality, International
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes" (2005), 85 B.U. L. Rev. 363.
To the extent that the Washington proceedings were regarded as giving
impermissibly extraterritorial reach to U.S. governmental policies in ways that
breached Canadian sovereignty, the enforcement of a judgment might also be
regarded as the kind of eventuality for which the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. F-29, was enacted.
Lloyd's Underwriters v. Cominco Ltd., supra, footnote 1, at para. 78.
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because this would promote timely remediation of the environmental
harm. The Washington court also noted that the state's interest in the
coverage action was tied to the state's interest in the environmental
action against Teck Cominco. 32 This is not to suggest that
announcing such an interest forecasts an intention to treat the
question of coverage as subsumed under the question of liability, i.e.,
that if Teck were found liable, liability for its insurers would
inevitably follow. Of course, the Washington court would need to be
shown sufficient evidence to meet the requisite burden of proof under
U.S. law for the liability of each defendant. However, it is to say that
the court in Washington regarded the dispute between Teck Cominco
and its insurers as bound up with the questions of whether local
residents had suffered from harm caused to the environment and if so,
whether Teck Cominco should be held liable, and if it could not pay,
whether its insurers should be required to do so.
In the British Columbia proceeding, the issues seem likely to be
seen in a different light. The case would not be an extension of a claim
for environmental harm but a case about the rights and obligations of
commercial parties to one another in respect of an insurance policy. It
would not be a case primarily about whether Teck Cominco was
liable to the State of Washington under the U.S. environmental
legislation, but whether such liability was a risk that the insurers
undertook to cover in the policies in dispute. Again, this is not to
forecast the result in a case in which the record has not yet even been
established. It is, however, to say that the issues pleaded and the facts
adduced in the British Columbia proceedings seem likely to be
considered in a different context. The focus of the issues would not be
on recovering the costs of remediating environmental harm, but on
the reasonable expectations of commercial
33 parties arising from their
contractual dealings with one another.
In other words, Teck Cominco is a wonderful case for considering
the appropriate response to parallel proceedings because it
demonstrates that, even in similarly framed claims, there may be a
real question about whether the cases are the same. It shows how the
32. Ibid., at para. 24.
33. Indeed, one view of the case might be that three wrongs do not make a right: it
may have been wrong for Trail Smelter to have caused environmental harm in the
United States despite its authorization to discharge slag into the Columbia River,
but it is unclear how this justifies sweeping aside a long history of intergovernmental cooperation in addressing environmental harm by applying CERCLA
extraterritorially and retroactively, and it is equally unclear how the issue is
resolved by imputing foreseeability to this application of CERCLA to Teck
Cominco's insurers.
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equities of the parties and the broader social concerns that shape the
analysis of the legal issues may vary significantly from one forum to
another.
IV. ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL
That there can be significant differences in the perspectives of
American and Canadian courts on similarly framed claims may be an
inconvenient truth for Canadian courts. A deeply rooted feature of
Canadian legal traditions is the ideal of forum neutrality. Canadian
courts do not readily regard their mandate in commercial disputes as
one of accepting or retaining Jurisdiction for the purpose of giving
effect to local social policies.14 They focus on other questions questions about which court is in a better position to decide the case as
a result of the location of the evidence and in which court the parties
are best able to present their claims and defences.
It is difficult to pinpoint where the idea of forum neutrality came
from. Whatever its source, the idea seems so fundamental to
Canadian legal traditions that it is accepted as the norm, and even
understood as a basic feature of any legal system deserving respect. It
would seem vaguely absurd to suggest to a Canadian court that, in
making jurisdictional determinations in civil matters, it should be
motivated by local policies. And to suggest to a Canadian court that a
court in another legal system might be so motivated seems likely to be
heard as a criticism of that court, one that is likely to be rejected unless
definitively proved. And yet it is clear that some legal systems, such as
those in the United States, operate on different assumptions.3 5 As is
frequently observed in the United States, one of the courts' accepted
roles is to serve the needs of local communities and vindicate the
policies of the forum.
Here is the conundrum: how does a court that is committed to the
principle of forum neutrality evaluate the relative merits of
34.

35.

See Hunt v. T&Nplc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at para. 35, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 16, [1994]

1 W.W.R. 129 where this observation was made in a slightly different context.
Indeed, the full faith and credit clause in the U.S. Constitution is a direct
response to the parochial tendencies of the governments and judiciaries of the
several states at the time of the Union, which threatened the very prospect of the
states uniting together to form a single country. So significant was this concern
that the provision enjoys pride of place in the U.S. Constitution in Article IV. 1,
immediately following the outline of the three branches of government in the first
three articles. The decision to introduce a constitutional mechanism to produce
decisional harmony as a result of the awareness of the lack of forum neutrality
also gave rise to constitutional provisions such as diversity jurisdiction, under
which parties from different states need not subject their disputes to the state
courts at all, but can have them removed to the federal courts.
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competing jurisdictional claims where the alternative forum has
declared an interest in deciding the case in order to support local
social policies? If each court regarded it a matter of duty to exercise
jurisdiction, the question would be no sooner asked than answered:
each court would act as mandated despite the irreconcilable conflict
of jurisdictions. How could Canadian courts, reluctant to regard
themselves as motivated by local social concerns, articulate reasons
why, in refusing to stay their proceedings, they are not themselves
acting on the basis of parochial interests. The British Columbia
courts, both at first instance and on appeal, seemed strongly
motivated to retain jurisdiction. Would it be wrong to suggest that
British Columbia should assert an interest in providing a forum in
which the liability under the insurance policies would be determined
on the basis of contract law principles and not on the basis of
promoting the efficacy of the environmental remediation efforts in
Washington? Would this be parochialism?
Perhaps not when viewed in the context of two other recent
appellate decisions. In GreConDimterInc. v. J.R. Normandlnc.,36the
Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the need to show respect for
party autonomy in international contracts and to give effect to the
reasonable expectations of the parties. The exclusive jurisdiction
clause in the contract between the defendant and the guarantor
nominating another court for the resolution of disputes prevented the
Quebec court from exercising jurisdiction over the claim against
3 7 the
guarantor even though it had jurisdiction over the main claim.
And in Society of Lloyd's v. Saunders, the "Names" sought to have
their contracts with Lloyd's rescinded on the basis that they had been
recruited in Ontario to participate without adequate disclosure of the
risks of contractual undertakings of unlimited liability and,
therefore, in breach of the provincial security laws. 38 The Court of
Appeal for Ontario noted the local policy interest favouring the
exercise of jurisdiction to permit a proceeding in which the concerns
underlying local securities laws would be vindicated. However, this
36.

[2005] 2 S.C.R. 401, 255 D.L.R. (4th) 257.

37. It is true that the GreCon case, ibid., was different from this case in that it
involved a contract containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause, but on the
assumption that a Quebec court would have applied the law chosen or reasonably
expected by the parties, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the action on the
guarantee acknowledged the rights of parties contracting for indemnification to
have their dispute resolved as they might reasonably have contemplated at the
time of contracting.
38. Society of Lloyd's v. Meinzer (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 688, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 148
O.A.C. 362, sub norn. Society of Lloyd's v. Saunders (C.A.), leave to appeal to

S.C.C. refused 212 D.L.R. (4th) vii.
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interest was outweighed by the "potential mass confusion and
damage to the domestic insurance market that such a ruling would
have" 39 by interfering with the parallel proceeding in England
seeking to enforce the contractual obligations of the Names.
It could be suggested that the result in that instance of parallel
proceedings was easier to reach for a common law court in Canada
than one upholding jurisdiction in the British Columbia courts in this
case. It was consistent with the result reached in many similar
proceedings involving the Names in other countries, 40 and it involved
declining jurisdiction rather than assertingit in the face of a parallel
foreign proceeding. However, it could also be suggested that the
result reflects the support consistently shown by Canadian courts for
party autonomy and for the reasonable expectations of parties to
international commercial contracts.
This was the policy choice made by the English Court of Appeal in
MidlandBank when, following the controversy over the reach of U.S.
antitrust legislation in the Laker Airways insolvency,4 1 the Midland
Bank wasjoined in the U.S. litigation. The U.S. litigation against the
airlines, who were said to have conspired to put Laker Airways out of
business, was expanded to include English banks as a result of their
having lent money to Laker Airways pursuant to the direction of the
Bank of England. The Court of Appeal in England agreed that the
dealings between the Banks and Laker Airways were commercial
dealings in England, which the parties might reasonably expect to be
assessed under English law. These dealings were not to be made the
subject of the U.S. antitrust litigation in which the banks might be
found liable pursuant to the application of the U.S. legal principles.
As a result, the English court granted an anti-suit injunction.42
Indeed, in a number of situations where the law governing the matter
would be applied more reliably in one court than it would in another,
43
the English courts have held that court to be the natural forum.
Perhaps, in the end, the contrast between forum neutrality and
parochialism is too simplistic for a world in which crossborder

39. Ibid., at para. 88.
40. See Genevieve Saumier, "What's in a Name? Lloyd's, International Comity and
Public Policy" (2002), 37 C.B.L.J. 388.
41. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 39 (H.L.); Laker
Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (1984).
42. Midland Bank plc v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1986] 1 All E.R. 526, [1986] Q.B. 689
(C.A.).
43. Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 478-79
and cases cited in footnotes 26-30.
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dealings entail an increasingly complex mix of economic and social
concerns. Under these circumstances, all things are rarely equal.
V. COMITY AND THE WISDOM OF DEFERENCE
On a closer look, the question in the Teck Cominco appeal may well
be whether Canadian courts are prepared to exercise jurisdiction and
risk producing inconsistent results in order to give effect to policies
such as party autonomy in international contracts where a foreign
court in a parallel proceeding seems likely to be guided by different
priorities. It is a difficult question because, in permitting the
conditions that produce inconsistent results, it could eventually
become necessary to revisit the deference shown to foreign
judgments.
And it remains an open question. There has been scant occasion in
the last two decades when Canadian courts have used the word
"comity" to describe anything but a reason for greater deference to
foreign courts in questions ofjurisdiction and judgments. And yet, a
version of comity that requires the assumption that all things are
equal when it is clear that they are not is remarkably unworldly for
Canadian courts. It is all the more remarkable in view of the history of
the relations more generally between Canada and the United States,
in which Canada has not hesitated to exercise independent judgment
and to engage in principled dissent on important matters of social and
economic policy.
In a recent review of the question of parallel proceedings from the
U.S. perspective, one commentator concluded that the first-seised
rule should be used as no more than a presumption that was subject to
other considerations.
[T]he courts should look to see whether the circumstances of the case suggest
that deference to the foreign court would violate domestic public policy,
prejudice the rights of those entitled to the protection of U.S. law, or whether
the facts indicate that the foreign action was contrived to usurp the "natural"
plaintiff's choice of forum by bringing a preemptive claim for a declaration
of non-liability. 4

It is difficult to see why such an approach would not be equally
suitable for Canadian courts or, at least, why it should not be taken
into account in formulating an approach that is suitable.
It is open to the Supreme Court in this appeal to stay the British
Columbia proceedings and, in this way, to endorse the perspective on
the issues that will be taken by the court in Washington. However, it
would be unfortunate if the appeal were allowed on the basis that
44.

N. Jansen Calamita, "Rethinking Comity", supra, footnote 6, at p. 675.
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Canadian courts should continue to presume that all things are equal
and may not take cognizance of differences in perspective between the
fora, particularly where this could result in compromising important
Canadian policies if deference is shown. This would be to fail to take
up the challenge of developing a more sophisticated approach to
comity- one that is much needed in an increasingly globalized world.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN
COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
The release of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Teck
Cominco creates a further opportunity to comment on the benefits of
collaboration and dialogue among the various participants in the
development of the common law.
A senior academic colleague (now a highly distinguished jurist)
once observed in a light-hearted way that academics were in a singular
position of authority because only they could purport to "overrule"
the pronouncements of the highest appellate courts - sometimes as
casually as in the course of a footnote. At the time, it seemed unlikely
that I would ever be in such utter disagreement as to seek to develop
the law by purporting to "dismiss" a decision in that way, but it
seemed even less likely that I would be in such utter agreement with a
decision commented upon that the commentary would be cast in the
role that this article now appears to serve. For although it seems that
the conclusions reached in the Teck Cominco decision and the
approach to the issues recommended in the article (which was
submitted before the hearing) are entirely consistent with one
another, the decision is such a model of succinct common law
reasoning that the article now reads almost like additional discussion
that might have been trimmed from a previous draft of the reasons.
Embarrassing as that might be for a commentator, it would be
unfortunate to conclude, either presumptuously, that the only thing
that stands between the article and the judgment is good editing, or
despondently, that the contents of the article are pure surplusage.
Rather, it is hoped that some of the discussion (such as that
concerning the relevance to the forum non conveniens analysis of the
approach to the applicable law likely to be taken in the alternative
forum) will be understood to be of the kind that an academic is better
placed to articulate than a court at this stage in the development of the
law. To the extent that this is so, the explanation in this article of the
possible motivation for the decision that was reached could be useful
in developing the law further in the time ahead.

